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IN RE S.A. W.: THE ULTIMATE PROTECTION
OF CHILDREN'S WELFARE
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court and the Oklahoma Supreme
Court have both recognized that the relationship between parents and
their children is a fundamental, constitutionally protected right.1 As
such, parental rights may be terminated only to promote a compelling
state interest.2 In Oklahoma, this means that parental rights may be
terminated only to protect the child from harm or to serve the best
interests of the child.3
The Oklahoma Supreme Court requires certain procedural safe-
guards during termination proceedings.' First, parents are entitled to
appointed counsel if they are indigent.5 The trial court is required to
advise parents of this right.6 Second, children have the right to in-
dependent counsel, free of charge, during termination proceedings.
7
Prior to In re S.A.W,' this right of the child was applicable only to
state-initiated proceedings. However, S.A.W. expanded the child's
right to separate counsel to include all parental rights termination pro-
ceedings, whether privately or state-initiated.
The expansion of the child's rights in S.A.W. allows all parties to
argue their positions in the termination proceedings so that the trial
court will be able to determine what is truly in the best interests of the
child. In addition, the expansion of the right of the child to independ-
ent counsel will lessen the chance of termination of parental rights
when it is not in the child's best interests.
1. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,399 (1923); In re Chad S., 580 P.2d 983, 985 (Okla.
1978).
2. Chad S., 580 P.2d at 985.
3. D. Marianne Brower Blair, Parent-Initiated Termination of Parental Rights: The Ulti-
mate Weapon in Matrimonial Warfare, 24 TULSA LJ. 299, 321 (1989).
4. Chad S., 580 P.2d at 985.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 986.
7. Id. at 985.
8. In re S.A.W., 856 P.2d 286 (Okla. 1993).
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II. STATEMENT OF IN RE SA. W.
A. Facts
S.A.W. was born on December 22, 1985, and is the daughter of
the appellants, Eric Winbigler and Deborah McCallum. 9 Since March
4, 1988, S.A.W. has lived continuously with the appellee, Joan Torres,
and her husband, Juan Torres, Jr.10 On March 21, 1988, Torres was
given letters of guardianship of S.A.W., but within three months of
those letters, Winbigler and McCallum moved to terminate the guard-
ianship." The motion to terminate was denied, and the Court of Ap-
peals affirmed. 2
On November 29, 1989, Torres filed a petition to terminate the
parental rights of the appellants, and to declare S.A.W. eligible for
adoption without their consent. 3 The reason for the termination was
the parents' alleged failure to provide support for the twelve months
preceding the filing of the petition.' 4 In particular, the petition to ter-
minate alleged the failure of Wimbigler and McCallum to support
S.A.W. within their means and earning capacity.' 5
A hearing occurred on January 8, 1990. The parents appeared
without an attorney.' 6 They informed the court that they were indi-
gent, and the court appointed a public defender to represent them.' 7
The hearing was reset to January 10, 1990.18 The testimony at this
hearing was unclear as to the financial condition of Winbigler and
McCallum.19
W'mbigler and McCallum testified that they bought Christmas
and birthday gifts for S.A.W. in 1988 and 1989.20 Deborah McCallum
made phone calls to Torres and spoke with her daughter. She also
sent eight letters.2 ' However, Torres testified that she did not read the
9. In re S.A.W., 856 P.2d 286, 287 (Okla. 1993). The appellants were not married. Id.
10. Id. Joan Torres is S.A.W.'s aunt. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. S.A.W., 856 P.2d at 287.
14. Id.
15. Id. The guardianship court had not ordered payment of child support by Winbigler and
McCallum. Id.
16. Id at 288.
17. .A.W., 856 P.2d at 288.
18. Id
19. Id The testimony showed that they worked for their landlord for a portion of 1988 in
exchange for rent and food. There was no evidence of steady income from March 1988 to No-
vember 1989. Both Winbigler and McCallum testified that they were employed in the towing
business in 1990, although their incomes were subject to expenses for their tow trucks. Id
20. Id
21. S.A.W., 856 P.2d at 288.
[Vol. 30:559
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IN RE S.A.W.
letters to S.A.W., nor did she tell her about them.' Torres further
testified that S.A.W. referred to Mrs. Torres as her mother and to Mr.
Torres as her father?3
After hearing the evidence, the trial judge ordered termination of
the parental rights of Winbigler and McCallum, and ordered an adop-
tion proceeding without their consent.24 The judge determined that it
would not be in the best interests of S.A.W. to return her to parents
whom she does not know.' The Court of Appeals affirmed this
judgment.26
B. Issue
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma granted appellants' petition for
certiorari to determine whether independent counsel should have
been appointed for the minor child2 7 Winbigler and McCallum ar-
gued that independent counsel should have been appointed to protect
the interests of S.A.W. in the termination proceedings. They ob-
served that a termination of parental rights has profound implications
upon the rights of the child, as well as upon those of the parents.29 For
instance, S.A.W. has a younger brother with whom she could lose con-
tact. 0 In the Torres' answer, they contended that the child's interests
were protected by the Torres, since the action to terminate parental
rights for willful failure to support is actually brought for the benefit
of the child.31 The Tores asserted that the legal contest is not be-
tween the guardian and the parents, but between the child and the
non-supporting parents.32
III. OKLAHoMA LAW PRIOR TO IN RE S.A. W.
A. Parents' Right to Counsel
In In re Chad S.,33 the court held that during a termination pro-




25. S.A.W., 856 P.2d at 288.
26. Id at 287.
27. Id
28. Id at 288.




33. 580 P.2d 983 (OkIa. 1978).
1995]
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and that counsel must be appointed for indigent parents-unless they
knowingly and intelligently waive that right.34 With this holding, the
court reversed the trial court's decision to terminate a mother's paren-
tal rights. It did so on the grounds that the mother had no counsel,
and was not advised that the court would appoint counsel if she was
indigent. 5 The court recognized that Oklahoma statutory authority
requires the appointment of counsel to indigent parties in a termina-
tion proceeding.36 However, the court noted that it had never previ-
ously required the trial court, as a matter of constitutional due
process, to advise parents of their right to court-appointed counsel.37
Since the parent-child relationship is a fundamental, constitution-
ally-protected right, the court found "that the full panoply of proce-
dural safeguards must be applied to child deprivation hearings. ' 38
Therefore, the court in Chad S. held that parents must be advised of
their right to counsel.39 In reaching this conclusion, the court was per-
suaded by the rationale in Davis v. Page.40 The district court in Davis
equated child dependency hearings involving the state with criminal
trials, stating:
While a dependency proceeding is not a criminal proceeding, it
is substantially similar. The state is the initiating party, the proceed-
ing is formal, and the potential loss is quite substantial. Since the
state is threatening the deprivation of a fundamental interest, it
34. Id. at 985-86; see also In re S.A.W., 856 P.2d 286, 288-89 (Okla. 1993).
35. Chad S., 580 P.2d at 983.
36. Id. at 985. The court cited OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 24(a), 1109(b) (1971). Section 24 (a)
provides:
When it appears to the court that the minor or his parent or guardian desires coun-
sel but is indigent and cannot for that reason employ counsel, the court shall appoint
counsel. In any case in which it appears to the court that there is such a conflict of
interest between a parent or guardian and child that one attorney could not properly
represent both, the court may appoint counsel, in addition to counsel already employed
by a parent or guardian or appointed by the court to represent the minor or parent or
guardian, provided that in all counties having Public Defenders, said Public Defenders
shall assume the duties of representation in proceedings such as above.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 24(a) (1971).
Section 1109(b) states:
If the child or his parents, guardian, or other legal custodian requests an attorney
and is found to be without sufficient financial means, counsel shall be appointed by the
court if the child is being proceeded against as a delinquent child, or a child in need of
supervision, or if termination of parental rights is a possible remedy, provided that the
court may appoint counsel without such request, if it deems representation by counsel
necessary to protect the interest of the child or of other parties.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1109(b) (1971).
37. Chad S., 580 P.2d at 985.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 986.
40. Id.; see also Davis v. Page, 442 F. Supp. 258 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
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IN RE S.A.W.
must provide counsel to indigent parents unless it can demonstrate
a compelling state interest in not providing counsel. Since the state
has no compelling interest in not providing counsel, the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the provision
of counsel to indigent parents in dependency proceedings.4'
The court in Davis also noted that implicit in the right to counsel
is the right to notice that such counsel will be provided without ex-
pense to indigent parents.4' Therefore, under Chad S., when the
assistance of counsel is constitutionally mandated, the right to counsel
does not depend upon a request.43
B. Child's Right to Counsel
Two years after the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in In re
Chad S., the court decided In re T.M.H. 4 In T.M.H., the court found
that a trial court's failure to appoint counsel to represent the child was
grounds for reversal of an order terminating parental rights.45 Once
again, the court found statutory authority that mandated the appoint-
ment of counsel to the child, if counsel had been requested on behalf
of the child.46 The court also found statutory authority which man-
dates the appointment of counsel to the child when the court finds it is
necessary to protect the interests of the child, even if no request for
counsel is made.47 Based on these statutes, the court held that "in-
dependent counsel must be appointed to represent the child[ ] if ter-
mination of parental rights is sought."'
The court reasoned that if a child is not represented by independ-
ent counsel during a termination proceeding, the child will be caught
in the middle while each attorney presents arguments from the view-
point of that attorney's client.49 And, even though each side will ar-
gue for the best interests of the child, each attorney has an underlying
desire to prevail for the client.50 Thus, by appointing an attorney for
41. Chad S., 580 P.2d at 985-86 (quoting Davis, 442 F. Supp. at 264).
42. Davis, 442 F. Supp. at 265.
43. Chad S., 580 P.2d at 986; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966).
44. 613 P.2d 468 (Okla. 1980).
45. ld at 469.
46. The court in In re T.M.H., as in Chad S., cited OK.A. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 24(a), 1109(b)
(1971).
47. T.M.H., 613 P.2d at 469. The court noted that OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1109 (1971) was
amended in 1977 to make appointment of counsel to the child mandatory if it is necessary to
protect the interests of the child. ld
48. T.M.H., 613 P.2d at 471.
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the child, a court assures that testimony will be presented, and cross-
examination will be done, by an advocate who will be interested solely
in the child's welfare."1
However, in Davis v. Davis, the court held that independent
counsel for the child in a private proceeding to terminate parental
rights is not required. 2 In Davis, the court noted that it had previ-
ously distinguished between private and state remedies.5 3 The court
observed that a termination proceeding under Oklahoma Statutes title
10, section 1130 is a state remedy in which potential conflicts exist
between the interests of the child and those of the state and the par-
ents.54 Therefore, the court found that a court must appoint an in-
dependent counsel to represent the child whenever tripartite concerns
are pressed in the context of proceedings under section 1130.-5 The
court further observed that an adoption without consent under
Oklahoma Statutes title 10, section 60.6 is a private remedy in which
counsel for the child is not required. 6
The court noted that, at common law, a parent's bond with the
child is indestructible and not terminable by judicial decree. 7 There-
fore, section 1130 is a statute that only partially abolishes the common
law, because it contains no language to suggest that it is applicable to
private litigation.5 8 In short, the court found that valuable common-
law rights, such as parental rights, cannot be destroyed by statutes
which do not explicitly or implicitly address themselves to in-
terparental contests:59
In addition, the court stated that only the demonstration of a
compelling state concern will justify intrusion upon the privacy and
sanctity of the parent-child relationship.' Unless the child is subject
to harm, the state may not intervene.61 "Resort to state-action reme-
dies by private individuals would result in gross distortion of the legal
51. 1d
52. Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102 (Okla. 1985).
53. Id. at 1110.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1102. The court noted that mandatory representation for the child in all state
termination proceedings is based on the state's responsibility to protect the interests of the child.
Id.
56. Davis, 708 P.2d at 1102.
57. Id. at 1111.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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demarcation line that historically has separated purely private inter-
spousal claims from the legislatively-sanctioned process governing
state intrusion into the traditional pre-[Juvenile] Code areas of family
immunity."'62 Accordingly, the court found that a child is not entitled
to appointed counsel in a private proceeding involving termination of
parental rights.6"
C. Payment of the Child's Attorney Fees
In In re Christopher W., the court held that "parents or other liti-
gants are not responsible for paying for the services of an attorney
appointed because of a conflict of interest between parent and
child."' In so holding, the court reversed the trial court's order that
Christopher's parents and grandparents each pay a portion of Christo-
pher's attorney fees and professional witness fees.6' The court rea-
soned that it was the intent of the legislature that the state be
responsible for assuring that the child is adequately legally repre-
sented when it is necessary for the child to be represented in termina-
tion proceedings, and in proceedings to have a child declared
dependent or neglected.66
The court examined Oklahoma Statutes title 10, section 1109 and
noted that the statute deals with the appointment of attorneys for two
separate classes.67 The first class is that of the parents, guardians, or
other legal custodians, while the second class is that of children.68
When addressing the appointment of counsel to children, the legisla-
ture does not require that the child or his parents be indigent, in order
for counsel to be appointed.69 Nor does the legislature require a re-
quest to be made for counsel.7 ° Instead, appointment can be made
when it is necessary to protect the interests of the child.71 Therefore,
the appointment of an attorney to represent the parents, guardian, or
62. l
63. Id at 1110.
64. In re Christopher W., 626 P.2d 1320,1323 (Okla. 1980). Appellee argued that the attor-
ney fees were authorized under OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1121 (1971). Id. at 1322.
65. Christopher W., 626 P.2d at 1323. Christopher's paternal grandparents had initiated a
petition seeking the termination of parental rights of Christopher's parents. The trial court
found that there was a conflict of interest between Christopher and his parents, and therefore
appointed separate counsel to represent Christopher. Id. at 1321.
66. Id. at 1322.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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legal custodian is related to the financial ability of the parents, guard-
ian, or legal custodian, while the appointment of counsel to the child is
not.72
Although section 1109 addresses the appointment of counsel to
the child, it is silent as to who pays for the child's counsel. 73 However,
the court observed that Oklahoma Statutes title 10, section 24 does
address the payment of attorney's fees for the child.74 The court
found that in consideration of section 24, the county is to compensate
the child's attorney out of that county's court fund, if a public de-
fender is not available.75 And, if a public defender is available, the
Public Defender's office is to provide such services.76
IV. DECISION OF IN RE S.A. W.
In S.A.W., the court expanded its holding in T.M.H. to include
privately initiated petitions for termination of parental rights.77 As
noted above, the court in T.M.H. held that when termination of pa-
rental rights is sought, independent counsel must be appointed to rep-
resent the children.78 But, the court limited this requirement of
independent counsel in Davis v. Davis by holding that separate coun-
sel is required only in state-initiated proceedings.79
In expanding its holding in T.M.H., the court noted that Davis
held termination of parental rights under Oklahoma Statutes title 10,
section 1130 was available only for state-initiated cases.80 However,
the court in S.A.W. observed that in 1986 the legislature added subsec-
tion D to section 1130, which allows private suit for the termination of
parental rights.81 Thus, state-initiated termination proceedings and
privately-initiated termination proceedings now fall under the same
72. Id.




77. In re S.A.W., 856 P.2d 286, 290 (Okla. 1993).
78. In re T.M.H., 613 P.2d 468, 471 (Okla. 1980).
79. 708 P.2d 1102 (Okla. 1985).
80. S.A.W., 856 P.2d at 290.
81. Id. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1130(D) (1991) provides:
A parent or guardian of a child may petition the court to terminate the parental
rights of a parent or the parents of a child for any of the grounds listed in paragraphs 1,
2 or 5 of subsection A of this section. A prior finding by a court that a child is delin-
quent, deprived or in need of supervision shall not be required for the filing of such
petition by the parent or guardian.
(Subsection D is now subsection C in OKrA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1130 (Supp. 1994)).
[Vol. 30:559
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statute." With this change, the court in S.A.W. saw no rational reason
to hold that a child is not entitled to independent counsel in a pri-
vately-initiated proceeding.8 3
When the court in S.A.W. applied this new rule to the facts of the
case, it was clear that the requirement of counsel could work for the
benefit of S.A.W. 4 The trial court's concern was the parents' failure
to make any payment, other than gifts, in the year before the petition
was filed.8s The trial judge stated that termination of parental rights
was in the best interest of the child, although no independent counsel
was present to argue the child's best interest.86 Had counsel been
present, evidence might have been presented showing that maintain-
ing parental ties was in the child's best interests.87 In addition, in-
dependent counsel might have clarified the confusing testimony
regarding the financial status of the parents.88
Since S.A.W. was entitled to separate counsel, but was not ap-
pointed one, the Oklahoma Supreme Court vacated the decision of
the Court of Appeals. It reversed and remanded the judgment of the
trial court for disposition of the case in a manner consistent with the
views expressed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court.89
V. ANALYSIS OF IN RE SA. W.
The only compelling interest that a state can have in terminating
a parent's rights is the welfare of the child.90 However, there is no
possible way to determine the best interests of the child without in-
dependent counsel. When an adult hires an attorney, or has an attor-
ney appointed, to act as counsel in a parental rights proceeding, the
adult is that attorney's client. The attorney has a duty to zealously
represent his client. This means that the attorney will argue for what
is in the best interests of his client, and sometimes this will conflict
82. S.A.W., 856 P.2d at 290. As noted in the preceding text, the court in Davis v. Davis
found that privately-initiated termination proceedings were actionable under OKLA. STAT. tit.
10, § 60.6 (1981), and not under section 1130. Davis, 708 P.2d at 1112.




87. S.A.W., 856 P.2d at 290. Since fundamental rights are involved, a trial court has inher-
ent discretion in cases concerning the termination of parental rights. Id at n.11 (citing In re
Adoption of A.G.K., 728 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986)).
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with what is in the best interests of the child involved in the proceed-
ings. However, the attorney is not in the position to determine if his
client's wishes are in line with what is best for the child. Therefore,
the child is left without a voice during parental rights termination
proceedings.
In re S.A.W. solved this problem by giving the child an advocate
who will argue for the child's best interests. Counsel may determine
that the child's best interests are to maintain parental ties, or counsel
may choose to argue that the child would be better off without his
parents. Whatever counsel chooses to argue, it is certain that it will be
for the welfare of the child.
It is only logical that the court would expand the protection of the
welfare of the child to allow independent counsel in all termination
proceedings-including those that are privately initiated. In S.A.W.,
the court noted that there would more likely be a conflict of interest in
privately-initiated proceedings than there would be with state-initi-
ated proceedings.9 This reasoning is well-grounded, since the state
has nothing to gain, except protection of the child from harm, when it
seeks termination of parental rights. On the other hand, private par-
ties cannot possibly remain neutral when they are fighting for the cus-
tody of a child.
Further, the court in S.A.W. recognized that the Oklahoma Legis-
lature had amended section 1130 by adding subsection D, which al-
lows a private suit for termination of parental rights.92 Now, both
state-initiated and privately-initiated proceedings are governed by the
'same statute. This change invalidates the court's finding in Davis v.
Davis that appointment of independent counsel to a child was not re-
quired in a private suit, because there was no language in section 1130
to show the legislature's intent to include private suits in section 1130.
Therefore, the expansion of the child's rights in termination proceed-
ings flows not only from the Oklahoma Supreme Court's preceding
cases and policies, but also from statutory amendments.
VI. CONCLUSION
The holding of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in In re S.A.W.
gives children the ultimate protection during termination of parental
rights proceedings. By expanding the protections afforded to children
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in termination proceedings, the court lessens the chance of unneces-
sary termination. Under S.A.W., children are afforded an advocate
who will argue for the best interests of the child in all termination
proceedings, whether privately or state-initiated. When this protec-
tion is combined with the parents' rights to appointed counsel, the
court has ensured that future termination proceedings will produce
results which truly are in the best interests of the child.
Cathleen Ryan
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